

Interesting Primitives and Applications Of Cryptography

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July 5, 2017

- Bit Commitment Schemes
- Zero knowledge proofs

Coin flipping

Alice



Makes her call x

Reveals her call to Bob

Bob



Tosses a coin in Alice's presence

Declares who is the winner

Coin flipping over distance

Alice



Bob



Makes her call x

Can Alice still reveal her call to Bob before coin toss?

Coin flipping over distance

Alice



Bob



Makes her call x

Can Alice reveal her call to Bob before coin toss? **No.**

Bob may report the toss wrongly.

Coin flipping over distance

Alice



Bob



Tosses a coin

Can Bob reveal the coin toss without knowing Alice's call?

Coin flipping over distance

Alice



Bob



Tosses a coin

Can Bob reveal the coin toss without knowing Alice's call? **No.**

Alice may modify her call.

Coin flipping over distance



Trusted party

Alice



Bob



Coin flipping over distance



Trusted party

Alice



**But I don't exist!!
Figure it out yourself!**

Bob




Coin flipping over distance by commitment

Alice




makes her call x
Locks her call in a box



Bob



tosses a coin



opens the box and
checks Alice's call

If Alice's call is ' x ', Accept and
Declares who is the winner

Else Reject

Coin flipping over distance by commitment

Alice



makes her call x
Locks her call in a box



= com

Bob



tosses a coin

toss result



= dec

opens the box and
checks Alice's call

Declares who is the winner


Mathematically..

Alice

Makes her call x

$(dec, com) = Commit(x)$

Bob



If $Decommit(x, dec, com) = \text{Accept}$

Announces who is the winner

Else Reject

Properties of Bit-Commitment schemes

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Sender's security: Hiding

The receiver should not know whether the committed bit is 0 or 1, on seeing the commitment *com*.

Properties of Bit-Commitment schemes

Sender's security: Hiding

The receiver should not know whether the committed bit is 0 or 1, on seeing the commitment *com*.

Receiver's security: Binding

After committing to 0, sender shouldn't be able to generate *dec'* that decommits *com* to 1 and vice-versa.

Building blocks

Adversary

- **Information theoretic:** Has unbounded computing power
 - Example: Can easily run exponential time algorithms.

Building blocks

Adversary

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- **Computational:** Has limited computing power
 - Example: Can only run polynomial time algorithms.
 - **Probabilistic Poly time** Adversary is a computational adversary that can flip coins.

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Adversary is an algorithm!!!

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
Adversary is an algorithm!!!

Building blocks

One way function


Building blocks

One way function




Building blocks

One way function




Building blocks

One way function



Building blocks

One way function



A function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ is one-way if

- Given x , $f(x)$ is efficiently computable.
- $\Pr[\text{Adversary wins in OWF game}]$ is negligible.

Building blocks

One way function

- Why randomly chosen x ?

Building blocks

One way function

- Why randomly chosen x ?
- Do OWF's exist information theoretically?

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Building blocks

One way function

- Why randomly chosen x ?
- Do OWF's exist information theoretically? No


Building blocks

One way function

- Why randomly chosen x ?
- Do OWF's exist information theoretically? **No**
- Proving existence of a OWF is an open problem.


Building blocks

Hard core predicate



Building blocks

Hard core predicate




A boolean function $hcp : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, is hard core predicate of a function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$, if

- Given x , $hcp(x)$ is efficiently computable.
- $\Pr[\text{Adversary wins in HCP game}]$ is $\frac{1}{2} + \text{negligible}$.

Building blocks

Hard core predicate



A boolean function $hcp : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, is hard core predicate of a function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$, if

- Given x , $hcp(x)$ is efficiently computable.
- $\Pr[\text{Adversary wins in HCP game}]$ is $\frac{1}{2} + \text{negligible}$.

Every OWF has a HCP.

Building blocks

One way permutation

$f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is a OWP if f is a

- Permutation
- One way function

Constructing commitments from OWP

f is a OWP.

Sender



Receiver



$y \in_R \{0, 1\}^n;$

Commit phase

$$com = (f(y), x \oplus hcp(y))$$

→

Decommit Phase

$x, dec = y$

→

Parse com as (a, b)

If $a == f(dec)$ and
 $b \oplus hcp(dec) = x$

Accept

Else Reject

Constructing commitments from OWP

Sender



f is a OWP.

Receiver



$y \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$;


Commit phase

$$\text{com} = (f(y), x \oplus \text{hcrp}(y))$$

—————→

Hiding: Having seen com , can Bob know whether $x = 0$ or $x = 1$?

Constructing commitments from OWP



Hiding holds as $hcp(y)$ is unpredictable.

Constructing commitments from OWP

f is a OWP.

Sender



Receiver



$y \in_R \{0, 1\}^n;$

Commit phase


$$com = (f(y), x \oplus hcp(y))$$

$$x', dec' = y'$$

Decommit Phase

Binding: Can Alice commit to x , and send dec' that decommits to $1-x$?

Constructing commitments from OWP



Binding holds as f is a OWP

If $y' \neq y$ then $f(y') \neq f(y)$
Therefore receiver rejects x'

Bit commitments : Summary

- Motivation
- Building blocks
- An explicit construction


Zero Knowledge Proofs

Zero Knowledge Proofs

- Motivation
- Properties
- ZKP for graph coloring

ZKP: Motivation

I can count the
number of leaves.



Let me test




ZKP: Motivation


Ofcourse, I won't !!
It's my knowledge



Tell me your spell




ZKP: Motivation



Tosses a coin.
Plucks a leaf if heads.



ZKP: Motivation



$$\text{Prob}[\text{cheating wizard fails}] = \frac{1}{2}$$

Important application of ZKP

- Cloud computation

Properties of ZKP

Properties of ZKP

Verifier's security: Soundness

The prover should not be able to prove verifier false statements

Properties of ZKP


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
Prover's security: Zero knowledge

The verifier should not learn any additional information other than the statement being proved.

Graph 3-Coloring



3- colorable




Not 3-colorable


Given graph $G = (V, E)$, can we assign each vertex a color (one of the three colors) such that no two adjacent vertices have same color?

- For a graph G that is 3-colorable, the witness is the color assignment.

Graph 3-Coloring



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


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
Given graph $G = (V, E)$, can we assign each vertex a color (one of the three colors) such that no two adjacent vertices have same color?

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- Graph 3-Coloring is an NP-Complete problem.

Graph 3-Coloring



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Not 3-colorable

Given graph $G = (V, E)$, can we assign each vertex a color (one of the three colors) such that no two adjacent vertices have same color?

- For a graph G that is 3-colorable, the witness is the color assignment.
- Graph 3-Coloring is an NP-Complete problem.
- Therefore, no known algorithm with polynomial running time can decide whether a graph G is 3-colorable or not?

ZKP for Graph 3-Coloring

Prover

3-coloring C

$G=(V,E)$ is 3-colorable

Verifier

ZKP for Graph 3-Coloring

Prover

3-coloring C

Chooses random permutation of 3-colors

Re-assign colors based on permutation

$G=(V,E)$ is 3-colorable

Verifier

ZKP for Graph 3-Coloring

Prover

$G=(V,E)$ is 3-colorable

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3-coloring C

Chooses random permutation of 3-colors

Re-assign colors based on permutation

Commit to re-assigned colors of all vertices

$(dec_i, com_i) = \text{Commit}(\text{color}(V_i))$

(com_1, \dots, com_n)

\longrightarrow

ZKP for Graph 3-Coloring

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$G=(V,E)$ is 3-colorable

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(com_1, \dots, com_n)

reveal colors of u, v

Chooses an edge $(u, v) \in E_R$

ZKP for Graph 3-Coloring

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Chooses random permutation of 3-colors

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Commit to re-assigned colors of all vertices

$$(dec_i, com_i) = \text{Commit}(\text{color}(V_i))$$

$$(com_1, \dots, com_n)$$

→ reveal colors of u, v

$$\leftarrow color_u, color_v, dec_u, dec_v$$

- If $\text{Decommit}(color_u, com_u, dec_u) = \text{Accept}$
and $\text{Decommit}(color_v, com_v, dec_v) = \text{Accept}$
and $color_u \neq color_v$,

Accept that G is 3-colorable

Else reject

ZKP for Graph 3-Coloring

Soundness

- If G isn't 3-colorable, there exists an edge (u, v) such that $color(u) = color(v)$

ZKP for Graph 3-Coloring

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- $\Pr[\text{Verifier accepts a non 3-colorable graph}] \leq 1 - \frac{1}{n^2}$

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- Repeat the experiment n^3 times

ZKP for Graph 3-Coloring

Soundness

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- $\Pr[\text{Verifier rejects the graph}] \geq \frac{1}{n^2}$
- $\Pr[\text{Verifier accepts a non 3-colorable graph}] \leq 1 - \frac{1}{n^2}$
- Repeat the experiment n^3 times
- $\Pr[\text{Verifier accepts the non 3-colorable graph in all runs}]$

$$\leq \left(1 - \frac{1}{n^2}\right)^{n^3} \leq e^{-n}$$

ZKP for Graph 3-Coloring

Zero knowledge

- In a single run, verifier would only know colors of two vertices.

ZKP for Graph 3-Coloring

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- Colors of other vertices are hidden by commitments

ZKP for Graph 3-Coloring

Zero knowledge

- In a single run, verifier would only know colors of two vertices.
- Colors of other vertices are hidden by commitments
- In the next run the colors are randomly permuted, so the information of colors about previous run would not help

Reference

Foundations of Cryptography, Volume 1, Oded Goldreich.

Thank you

ZKP for Graph 3-coloring

$G=(V,E)$ is 3-colorable

Prover

3-coloring C

Verifier

(com_1, \dots, com_n)

Chooses an edge $(u, v) \in E$ uniformly

reveal colors of u, v

$color_u, color_v, dec_u, dec_v$

If $Decommit(color_u, com_u, dec_u) = 1$

and $Decommit(color_v, com_v, dec_v) = 1$

Accept that G is 3-colorable

Else reject

Building blocks

Computational hardness

- Why bother about Computational adversary?

Theorem

- *IT secure schemes are costly*

construction from OWP

Sender Receiver Hiding holds as $hcp(y)$ is unpredictable. Binding holds as f is a OWP. $Decommit(com, dec)$

{Parse com as (a, b)

Parse dec as y

If $a == f(y)$

Output $b \oplus hcp(y)$

Else Output \perp }

Coin flipping over distance

I can count the number of leaves.

Let me test.

Tosses a coin.

Plucks a leaf if heads.

Please count the leaves now.

$\text{Prob}[\text{cheating wizard fails}] = \frac{1}{2}$ Alice makes her call

Locks her call in a box

sends this box to Bob without key

Bob tosses a coin

Bob reveals the toss result

Alice reveals her call and sends the box key

Bob opens the box and crosschecks Alice's call

Winner is declared according to the toss result

Building blocks

Algorithms

- **Deterministic:** For a given input, output of the algorithm is fixed
 - Example: $f(x, y) = xy$

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- **Randomized:** Algorithm that has access to uniform bits.
 - For a given input there may several possible outputs depending on the uniform bits
 - Example: $f_{rand}(x, y) = \begin{cases} xy & \text{if } r = 01 \\ 2xy & \text{if } r = 10 \end{cases}$

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 - For a given input there may several possible outputs depending on the uniform bits
 - Example: $f_{rand}(x, y) = \begin{cases} xy & \text{if } r = 01 \\ 2xy & \text{if } r = 10 \end{cases}$
 - Randomized algorithm is deterministic given the uniform bits.

Coin flipping over distance

Alice

Makes her call x

$(dec, com) = Commit(x)$

Bob

com

```
graph LR; Alice -- com --> Bob; Bob -- b --> Alice; Alice -- "x, dec" --> Bob;
```

coin toss results in b

b

x, dec

If $Decommit(com, dec) = 1$,

Announce winner

else STOP