

Universal sentences

Kamal Lodaya

March 2021

Axiom system (Bernays, Hilbert-Ackermann 1928)

$t ::= x \in V \mid c \in C \mid f(t_1, \dots, t_n), f \in F_n$
 $A ::= P(t_1, \dots, t_n), P \in R_n \mid t_1 \approx t_2 \mid \text{True} \mid \text{False}$
 $\mid (\neg A) \mid (A \vee B) \mid (A \wedge B) \mid (A \supset B) \mid (A \equiv B) \mid \exists xA \mid \forall xA$

Proof system fHB: zHB +

(UInst) $\forall xA(x) \supset A(t)$, (EInst) $A(t) \supset \exists xA(x)$

(UGen) If $\vdash A \supset B(p)$, then $\vdash A \supset \forall xB(x)$, for p parameter not occurring in $A, \forall xB$

(UGen) If $\vdash A \supset \neg B(p)$, then $\vdash A \supset \neg \exists xB(x)$, for p parameter not occurring in $A, \exists xB$

One can get derived rules like:

(EGen) If $\vdash A(p) \supset B$, then $\vdash \exists xA(x) \supset B$, provided p parameter not occurring in $A, \exists xB$

Exercise (Witness)

Show that if $\exists xA(x)$ is consistent, so is $A(p)$ where p is a fresh parameter.

Refutations (Evert Beth 1955, Alan Robinson 1965)

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Refutation system fR: zR + new expansions

$[\dots, \forall x A(x), \dots] \rightarrow [\dots, A(t), \dots],$

$[\dots, \neg \exists x A(x), \dots] \rightarrow [\dots, \neg A(t), \dots],$

$[\dots, \exists x A(x), \dots] \rightarrow [\dots, A(p), \dots], p$ fresh parameter,

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Refutation:

- | | | |
|---|--|-----------------------|
| 1 | $[\neg(\forall x(P(x) \vee Q(x)) \supset \exists xP(x) \vee \forall xQ(x))]$ | <i>Negated</i> |
| 2 | $[\forall x(P(x) \vee Q(x)); [\neg(\exists xP(x) \vee \forall xQ(x))]$ | <i>1, NotImplies</i> |
| 3 | $[\neg \exists xP(x)]; [\neg \forall xQ(x)]$ | <i>2b, NotOr</i> |
| 4 | $[\neg Q(p)]$ | <i>3b, NotForall</i> |
| 5 | $[\neg P(p)]$ | <i>3a, NotExists</i> |
| 6 | $[P(p), Q(p)]$ | <i>2a, Forall, Or</i> |
| 7 | $[Q(p)]$ | <i>5, 6, UnitCut</i> |
| 8 | $[\]$ | <i>4, 7, UnitCut</i> |

FOL Hintikka theory (Jaakko Hintikka 1955)

Definition (Fitting, Definition 5.7.1)

An *FOL Hintikka theory* Th (also called downwards consistent) has the following conditions in addition to propositional ones.

- 1 $False, \neg True \notin Th$; for P in At , $\{P, \neg P\} \not\subseteq Th$
- 2 ... and so on for the propositional conditions seen earlier
- 3 If $\forall xA$ in Th , then $\{A(t) \mid t \text{ closed term}\} \subseteq Th$
- 4 If $\neg \exists xA$ in Th , then $\{\neg A(t) \mid t \text{ closed term}\} \subseteq Th$
- 5 If $\exists xA$ in Th , then $A(p) \in Th$ for fresh parameter p
- 6 If $\neg \forall xA$ in Th , then $\neg A(p) \in Th$ for fresh parameter p

Items (5) and (6) of the definition are tricky.

Universal sentences (Tarski 1954, Jerzy Łós 1955)

If the prenex normal form of a sentence only has universal quantifiers, it is **universal** or in the **A fragment**. The dual is **existential** or in the **E fragment**.

Theorem

Consistent A theory is satisfiable in an FOL model. Valid E sentence is provable in fHB proof system using instantiations.

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Grounding: Take all closed term instantiations of $\forall y_1 \dots \forall y_m A$ to satisfy Hintikka condition (3). Consistency by **(UInst)**.

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W.l.g., suppose $\exists x_1 \dots \exists x_n \neg A$ valid. Then $\forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n A$ unsat. So $\forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n A$ is inconsistent. That is, $\vdash \neg \forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n A$. By **(UInst)** and **(EInst)** repeatedly, $\vdash \exists x_1 \dots \exists x_n \neg A$.