

Evaluating Attack Amplificationin Online Social Networks

Blase E. Ur and Vinod Ganapathy blaseur@rci.rutgers.edu, vinodg@cs.rutgers.edu Rutgers University

Online Social Networks

- facebook
 - 200 million monthly unique visitors
 - Founded in 2004



- 126 million monthly unique visitors
- Founded in 2003
- flickr[™]
 - 64 million monthly unique visitors
 - Founded in 2004

Hubs Exists in Social Networks

- Hubs- very popular users
 - Large number of friends
 - Large number of page views
- Average MySpace user has 200 friends
- MySpace Hubs include celebrities, musicians
 - Rihanna: 1,600,000 friends, 85,000,000 views
 - Tila Tequila: 3,700,000 friends, 184,000,000 views

Hubs Enable Attack Amplification

- Attack Amplification: increasing the effects of an attack by coercing a large number of Web users to unwittingly join in
- Hubs are treated the same as ordinary users
- By posting on hubs' pages, <u>ordinary users</u> can amplify attacks
- This threat should be stopped by Social Networks


Outline

- Motivation
- Background on Social Networks
- Attack Description
- Evaluation
- Remediation

Anatomy of a MySpace Page



Comments Allow HTML



Outline


- Motivation
- Background on Social Networks
- Attack Description
 - Denial of Service
 - Botnet Command & Control
- Evaluation
- Remediation





Internet Users Hub's Page Dec 5 11:47 AM Awesome Music_ myspace .com


Victim Web Server



Victim Web Server




Can be launched by an <u>arbitrary</u> Web user



Botnet C&C Channel



Botnet C&C Channel



Botnet C&C Channel Uninfected Users **Botnet Members** Hub's Page/ Awesome Music myspace .com

Outline


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Methodology




- Post comments on MySpace hubs' profiles
- Comments hotlink images from own server
- 1,073 out of 3,000 permitted HTML
- 942 out of 1,073 accepted friend request

DoS Research Questions




DoS Research Questions



DoS Research Questions

Victim Web Server



DoS- How Many Users

Goal: How many users will take part?

Method: Hotlink 1 pixel image, 12 days


719 different profiles



- 2,598,692 total hits
- 1,828,589 unique IP addresses

DoS- Diurnal Patterns


Number of Hits Per Hour, Over 12 Days



A very large number of users participate

DoS- Hub Popularity

Goal: How do hubs differ in popularity?



• 1% of the hubs provide 10% of the traffic


DoS- Total Bandwidth

 Goal: Are users leaving pages and reducing the bandwidth directed to a victim server?

Total size of all files in comment: 42 MB

Method: Hotlink 19 small (20 kb),
19 medium (80 kb), 19 large (2 MB) images

DoS-Total Bandwidth




- Users are leaving pages before they load
 - 60% of theoretical efficiency (42 MB)


DoS-Total Estimate

- Hotlink 42 MB on 719 profiles
- 65 Terabytes total (12 days)
- 525 Gigabytes directed toward victim server in the peak hour
- Attackers Can Concentrate on Top 10 Hubs
- Hotlink 42 MB on top 10 profiles
- 6.5 Terabytes total (12 days)
- 52.5 Gigabytes directed toward victim server in the peak hour

Botnet C&C Research Questions



Botnet C&C Research Questions



C&C- Lifetime of a Comment

- Goal: How long does a comment stay on a page? (Avoid reposting)
- Method: Measure when traffic drops below 10% of maximum from each profile
- Median Lifetime of a comment: 137 hours (5.5 days)
- 10 posts can reach 180,000 unique IP addresses over a few days

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Technique 1- Restrict Hubs

- By default, disallow HTML/media in posts on popular pages
- Why not restrict all HTML use?
 - Freedom / Customization
 - It's in use and popular
- At what threshold of friends / page views does a user become a hub?

Technique 2- Focused Monitoring

- Amplification attacks require hubs
- Monitor hubs only for suspicious posts

Technique 3- Friend Hierarchy

 Only allow friends of a certain relationship (other musicians) or particular social circle to post

- Friend Lists don't suffice
 - Huge time investment, few obvious rewards
 - Requires an automated solution

Technique 4- Reputation System

Only allow posts from users whose previous comments have met some criteria

 Require greater time investment from attacker

What metrics?

Can be gamed!

Take-Away Points

- Hubs allow arbitrary adversaries to amplify bandwidth-based attacks and the distribution of content
- Just 10 posts by arbitrary user:
 - Reach 180,000 unique IP addresses
 - Can direct 50+ GB of traffic toward a victim server in an hour
- Remediation is necessary at social network
 - Without losing "openness" of network



Thank You!

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