Seminars
View all Seminars | Download ICal for this eventIncentives and Information in Algorithmics Economics
Series: Department Seminar
Speaker: Dr. Divyarthi Mohan, Boston University, USA
Date/Time: Oct 21 10:00:00
Location: CSA Auditorium, (Room No. 104, Ground Floor)
Abstract:
Digital markets and platforms have shaped the algorithmic landscape into a complex ecosystem of strategic, self-interested entities. This has motivated the study and development of mechanisms or algorithms that are robust to strategic behaviour, using tools from algorithms, game theory and economics. Standard assumptions in mechanism design are too strong to capture the informational challenges present in many real scenarios, from ad auctions where bidders\' values depend on competitors\' private market data, to resource allocation where there is uncertainty about future demands. In this talk, I will provide an overview of my recent work that tackles three important challenges??strategic behavior, interdependence, and online decision making??going beyond standard assumptions. In particular, I will focus on my work establishing the first constant-approximation algorithms for prophet and secretary problems with interdependent values.
Speaker Bio:
Divyarthi Mohan is a postdoctoral researcher in the Faculty of Computing & Data Sciences at Boston University, hosted by Kira Goldner. Her research broadly lies at the intersection of computer science and economics, with a focus on algorithmic mechanisms design and the interplay of incentives and information. She obtained her PhD in Computer Science at Princeton University, advised by Matt Weinberg, and was previously a postdoctoral fellow at Tel Aviv University hosted by Michal Feldman. Her research has been recognized with the Simons-Berkeley Research Fellowship for Fall 2022, the class of 2021 Siebel Scholarship, and 2019 SEAS award for excellence at Princeton University, and her work was invited to the Highlights Beyond EC 2024.
Host Faculty: R Govindarajan